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____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 Kevin William Small was convicted of tax fraud in 
federal district court while he still had time left to serve on a 
Pennsylvania state prison sentence.  He arranged for a forged 
court order purporting to vacate his federal sentence to be 
presented to Pennsylvania state prison officials and, as a 
result, was released at the end of his state sentence rather than 
turned over to federal officials to begin serving his federal 
sentence.  This case presents the question of whether Small 
thereby escaped from “custody” within the meaning of the 
federal escape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 751.  We hold that he did, 
and we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
 
 
I. 
 
 On October 5, 2007, Small was sentenced by a federal 
court to 135 months of imprisonment for filing false tax 
returns.  He was serving a separate sentence in Pennsylvania 
state prison at that time, and the District Court ruled that his 
federal sentence was to be served consecutive to his state 
sentence.  After sentencing, he was returned to the 
Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Huntingdon 
(“Huntingdon”) to serve the remainder of his state sentence.  
The U.S. Marshal subsequently served the Commonwealth 
Department of Corrections with a document entitled 
“Detainer Based on Federal Judgment and Commitment,” 
which governed Small’s transfer to federal authorities upon 
completion of his state sentence.     
 
 In October 2011, the records staff at Huntingdon 
received documents in the mail, ostensibly from the Clerk of 
Court for the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania, but which in reality were forgeries 
sent at Small’s direction.  The documents appeared to bear the 
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Clerk’s signature and directed the entry of an accompanying 
order, supposedly issued by the District Court, vacating 
Small’s federal conviction and sentence.  The order appeared 
to have been signed by Judge Christopher C. Conner and to 
bear the District Court’s official seal.  The officials at 
Huntingdon accepted the papers, and Small was released 
upon the completion of his state sentence in January 2012, 
unbeknownst to federal authorities.  In March 2012, a federal 
agent learned of Small’s release from Huntingdon and his 
failure to begin his federal sentence.  Federal agents quickly 
located and arrested Small. 
 
 Small was indicted and charged with several crimes:  
forging the signature of a United States judge, forging a seal 
of a United States agency, mail fraud, conspiracy, and, the 
only relevant crime for our purposes, escape.  Small filed a 
motion to dismiss the escape charge on the ground that he 
was never in federal custody, a requisite element of the crime.  
His motion was denied by the District Court on April 30, 
2013.  He subsequently entered an “open plea” of guilty to all 
counts and was sentenced to a term of 60 months of 
imprisonment on each count, to be served concurrently with 
one another but consecutively to his tax fraud sentence.  
Small timely appealed. 
 
II. 
 
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
 
 We “apply a mixed standard of review to a district 
court’s decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment, 
exercising plenary review over legal conclusions and clear 
error review over factual findings.”  United States v. Stock, 
728 F.3d 287, 291 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 
III. 
 
 Small raises two arguments on appeal:  first, that he 
may challenge the sufficiency of Count III of the superseding 
indictment despite his unconditional guilty plea, and, second, 
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that Count III of the superseding indictment is insufficient on 
its face.  
 
 As a threshold matter, Small is correct that he may 
challenge the sufficiency of his indictment, and the 
Government does not argue otherwise.  However, Small’s 
arguments regarding the sufficiency of the indictment are 
unavailing.   
 
A. 
 
 Former Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
12(b)(3)(B), in effect when this case was briefed and argued,1 
provided that “at any time while the case is pending, the court 
may hear a claim that the indictment or information fails to 
invoke the court’s jurisdiction or to state an offense.”  Even 
when a defendant enters an unconditional guilty plea, Rule 
12(b)(3)(B) permits the defendant “to challenge for the first 
time on appeal the sufficiency of his superseding indictment.”  
United States v. Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 580, 589 (3d Cir. 2004).  
The Government does not dispute that Small may challenge 
the sufficiency of the indictment at this stage.  Accordingly, 
we consider Small’s appeal on the merits.      
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
 Small argues that the Government’s indictment was 
insufficient to make out a violation of the escape statute, 18 
U.S.C. § 751, either because it incorrectly stated the basis for 
Small’s state custody or because neither the federal detainer 
nor the District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence 
satisfied the custodial requirement of the statute.  To be 
sufficient, an indictment must allege that the defendant 
performed acts which, if proven, constitute a violation of the 
                                              
1 The Rule has since been amended, with the amendments 
taking effect on December 1, 2014.  See Order of the United 
States Supreme Court Amending the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (April 25, 2014), available at 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcr14_khlo.
pdf.     
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law that he is charged with violating.  See Hedaithy, 392 F.3d 
at 589.  In this case, the statute provides:  
 
Whoever escapes or attempts to 
escape from the custody of the 
Attorney General or his 
authorized representative, or from 
any institution or facility in which 
he is confined by direction of the 
Attorney General, or from any 
custody under or by virtue of any 
process issued under the laws of 
the United States by any court, 
judge, or magistrate judge, or 
from the custody of an officer or 
employee of the United States 
pursuant to lawful arrest, shall, if 
the custody or confinement is by 
virtue of an arrest on a charge of 
felony, or conviction of any 
offense, be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five 
years, or both . . . . 
 
18 U.S.C. § 751(a).  The Government meets its burden of 
proving a violation of the statute by establishing that the 
defendant “absent[ed]” himself “from custody without 
permission.”  United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407 
(1980).  This case presents the question of whether Small was 
ever in “custody” within the meaning of the statute.   
 
 On its face, the statute requires the Government to 
demonstrate that one of the following was true at the time of 
escape:  (1) the defendant was in the custody of the Attorney 
General or an authorized representative; (2) the defendant 
was confined in an institution at the direction of the Attorney 
General; (3) the defendant was in custody by virtue of any 
process issued under the laws of the United States by any 
court, judge, or magistrate judge; or (4) the defendant was in 
the custody of an officer or employee of the United States 
pursuant to a lawful arrest.  See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a).  Other 
Courts of Appeals have also applied this straightforward 
reading of the statute.  See, e.g., United States v. Gowdy, 628 
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F.3d 1265, 1267 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Evans, 159 
F.3d 908, 910 (4th Cir. 1998).   
 
 This case implicates the third prong — that the 
defendant was in custody “by virtue of any process issued 
under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or 
magistrate judge.”  18 U.S.C. § 751(a).  At oral argument, the 
Government argued that the predicate “process issued” it 
relies upon is the District Court’s judgment of conviction and 
sentence, not the federal detainer lodged with officials at 
Huntingdon.  Of course, because of the means by which 
Small effected his escape, he was never in the physical 
custody of the federal government or its agents.  The statute, 
however, specifies many forms of restraint from which a 
person may escape, including from an “institution,” from 
“custody . . . by virtue of . . . process,” or from “custody . . . 
pursuant to lawful arrest.”  Id.  Although it does not define 
the word “custody,” we believe the various kinds of restraints 
enumerated indicate Congress’s intent that the statute be 
applied broadly to those who would avoid a sentence they are 
required by law to serve.  A reading of the statute that limits 
“custody” to physical restraint would also read the word 
“confinement” out of the portion of the statute specifying the 
penalty for its violation.  See id. (“Whoever escapes . . . shall, 
if the custody or confinement is by virtue of arrest on a 
charge of felony [be sentenced.]” (emphasis added)).  Thus, 
we agree with other Courts of Appeals that have held that 
“custody does not require ‘direct physical restraint’ and may 
be ‘minimal’ or ‘constructive.’”  Gowdy, 628 F.3d at 1267 
(quoting United States v. Depew, 977 F.2d 1412, 1414 (10th 
Cir. 1992)); see also United States v. Keller, 912 F.2d 1058, 
1059 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cluck, 542 F.2d 728, 
731 (8th Cir. 1976).2   
                                              
2 As the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has noted, 
in 2006 and 2007 nearly forty percent of escape crimes 
involved “failures to report or return,” where the defendant 
simply did not show up to begin serving a sentence or failed 
to return from an authorized period of absence and therefore 
was not in physical custody at the time of escape.  Gowdy, 
628 F.3d at 1268 (citing Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 
122, 129 (2009)). 
7 
 
 The Court of Appeals in Gowdy faced facts nearly 
identical to those presented by this appeal, except that the 
defendant in that case was arguably less culpable than Small.  
In Gowdy, the defendant was supposed to serve a federal 
sentence after two state sentences ended, one in Mississippi 
and one in Alabama.  Gowdy, 628 F.3d at 1266.  At some 
point, officials in Mississippi lost Gowdy’s federal detainer 
and thus failed to transfer it to the Alabama correctional 
officials.  Id.  Gowdy was released upon completion of his 
Alabama state sentence and was later charged with escape 
once federal officials realized the error.  Id. at 166–67.   
 
 The Gowdy court upheld his conviction, holding that 
“the custodial requirement of § 751(a) is satisfied where a 
lawful judgment of conviction has been issued by a court 
against the defendant.”  Id. at 1268.  Other Courts of Appeals 
have similarly held that the elements of escape are established 
in the analogous situation where a defendant fails to report to 
begin a sentence.  See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 578 F.3d 
674, 681 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that “[i]t is clear from our 
cases that the [escape] statute prohibits not only escapes from 
secure custody, but also walkaways from nonsecure custody 
and failures to report at the end of an authorized period of 
freedom”); United States v. Keller, 912 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding that the defendant’s failure to report 
to a place of confinement at an appointed date and time 
qualified as an escape from federal custody). 
 
 Small argues that the Gowdy court’s definition of 
custody was too broad and that we should not follow it.  We 
are unpersuaded.  As the court there pointed out, the purpose 
of § 751(a) is “to protect the public from the danger 
associated with federal criminals remaining at large.”  
Gowdy, 628 F.3d at 1268.  An interpretation of the term 
“custody” that includes individuals subject to federal 
judgments of conviction advances that purpose, as those who 
are convicted but never physically transferred to federal 
custody are “federal criminals remaining at large.”   
 
 Small attempts to distinguish the cases upon which the 
Gowdy court relied by noting that in many of those cases the 
defendants had been, at some point, in “direct physical 
custody.”  Small Br. 23.  However, Small fails to explain why 
8 
 
this distinction makes a difference or to what extent it should 
inform our analysis of a different part of the statute, which 
does not require direct physical custody at any point by the 
Attorney General or her agents.  Indeed, Small’s proposed 
interpretation of the statute would essentially read out the 
section criminalizing escape from “custody . . . by virtue of 
any process issued under the laws of the United States by any 
court, judge, or magistrate judge.”  18 U.S.C. § 751(a).  That 
clause of the statute has no “direct” custody requirement.  
And, as the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently 
reaffirmed, “escape charges are not limited to defendants who 
were previously in the custody of the Attorney General.”  
United States v. Foster, 754 F.3d 1186, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014).  
Constructive custody under that provision of the statute is 
established simply by virtue of the process issued by the 
judge, in this case the judgment of conviction entered by the 
District Court.         
  
 In sum, we hold that the custodial requirement is 
satisfied if a lawful judgment of conviction has been issued 
by a federal court against the defendant.  As Small does not 
dispute that he was lawfully convicted and sentenced in 2007 
for filing false tax returns, that conviction is sufficient 
“process” under the statute to have placed him in the 
constructive custody of the federal government on completion 
of his state sentence such that his actions to avoid serving his 
federal sentence constitute the crime of escape.     
 
2. 
 
 Small also argues that the language of the indictment is 
contradictory and fails to support the Government’s 
contention that Small was in federal custody.  Count I of the 
indictment states that “Huntingdon State Prison officials 
released the defendant . . . upon the expiration of his state 
sentence rather than relinquishing him to the custody of the 
Attorney General of the United States to serve his federal 
sentence.”  Appendix (“App.”) 36.  Count III states that Small 
was held in Huntingdon “by virtue of a judgment and 
commitment of the United States District Court . . . and a U.S. 
Marshal’s detainer lodged in conjunction with the judgment 
and conviction.”  App. 38.  Small’s contention is that Count I 
on its face concedes that he was never in federal custody, as it 
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indicates that the state prison released him “rather than” 
relinquishing him to the custody of the Attorney General. 
 
 Small’s argument fails.  While it is correct that the first 
count of the indictment indicates that there was a failure to 
relinquish Small to the custody of the Attorney General, it is 
plausible from the context that this portion of the indictment 
refers to physical custody, which, as explained above, is only 
one possible basis for custody under the statute.  Count I 
makes no claim, one way or the other, about the constructive 
basis of Small’s custody pursuant to the federal court’s 
judgment of conviction.  And though the statute includes 
“escape from the custody of the Attorney General or his 
authorized representative,” the true basis of the charge against 
Small was an escape “from any custody under or by virtue of 
any process issued under the laws of the United States by any 
court, judge, or magistrate.”  18 U.S.C. §751(a).  Count III 
makes this clear by specifically mentioning that Small was 
subject to a “judgment and commitment of the United States 
District Court.”  App. 38.  Absent Small’s artifice, the state 
prison would have continued to hold him, pursuant to the 
District Court’s order, until he was transferred to the physical 
custody of federal agents.  Thus, while the wording of Count I 
may not have been ideal, it does not foreclose Small’s 
conviction for escape under Count III of the indictment. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment of conviction.  
 
 
